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American Indians in Court: The Burger and 
Rehnquist Years 
JOHN R. HERMANN 
Trinity University 
The Supreme Court and individual ju,tices' treatment of American Indian interests has 
generated relatively little scholarly attention. To fill this vmd in the extant literature, 
this study seeks to examine how American Indian interests fared before the Supreme 
Court of the Umted States during the Burger and Rehnqui't Courts (1969-1992 
October terms) and attempts to discern the factors influencing their treatment. The 
findings indicate that while American Indian interests won 48% of their cases, the 
Burger Court was much more -;ympathetic than the Rehnquist Court to the plight of 
this politically di-;advantaged group. The error correcting 'trategy, the ideological 
proclivities of the justices. and the issue area being litigated were all influential 
explanatory variables. Interestingly, the Solicitor General's Office had an adverse 
influence when it opposed American Indian interests as a direct or third party, but had 
little impact when supporting their intere-;ts. 
Like many other disadvantaged groups, American Indians have also turned to the courts 
when they lack access or clout in the electoral process (Cortner, 1968; Lawrence, 1990; 
O'Connor, 1980; O'Connor and Epstein, 1982, 1983; Vose, 1959). Unlike many other 
disadvantaged groups, the litigation activities of American Indians have not garnered 
much scholarly attention (but see, Deloria and Lytle, 1983; Shattuck and Norgren, 1979, 
1991; Wilkins, 1990). 1 
Given that so few scholars have offered a systematic treatment of American Indians in 
the American legal system, this study offers an examination of how American Indians 
fared in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts ( 1969-1992 terms) and attempts to discern the 
*Direct all corre.,pondence' to. John R Hermann. Departmenl of Polit1cal Science. Trinity University. 715 
Stadium Drive. San Antonio. TX 78212. 
The Social Science Journal, Volume 37, Number 2, pages 245-259. 
Copyright <D 2000 by Elsevier Science Inc. 
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 0362-3319. 
246 THE SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL Vol. 37/No. 2/2000 
factors that contributed to their success. More specifically, this study asks five questions: 
(1) How successful are American Indians in the Supreme Court? (2) Do American Indians 
fare better when they are the appellant? (3) What type of American Indian issues dominate 
the Court's agenda? (4) Does the Court's support for American Indians vary based on the 
issue present? (5) What impact does the presence of the Solicitor General as a party and 
an amicus have on American Indian cases? 
In addition to the apparent void in the literature, there are at least three reasons that 
American Indians' treatment by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts merit attention. First, at 
least two justices from the Burger Court have placed great importance on American Indian 
cases. Said one justice: 
We now have three westerners on the Court and we are very concerned about. . .  Indian 
cases. And you can tell by our votes for cert. that we are interested in them (Perry, 
1991, p. 261). 
Another justice stated: 
Actually, I think the Indian cases are kind of fascinating. It goes into history and you 
learn about it, and the way we abused �ome of the Indians, we that is the U.S. 
government (Perry, 1991, p. 262). 
Second, American Indian cases have received more attention from the Burger and the 
Rehnquist Courts. The Supreme Court decided more American Indian cases (35) in the 
1970s than in any other previous decade in the Court's history (Wilkinson, 1987, p. 2). 
The 1980s saw even more as the Supreme Court decided more than 40 cases involving 
Indian is�ues. 
And, third, given that American Indian activities are regulated primarily by the federal 
government (and not the states), the U.S. Supreme Court plays an especially important 
role in the policy formation of Indian rights. Since the Marshall Court's decision in 
Worcester v. Georgia ( 1832), the Court has consistently held that "matters affecting 
Indians in Indian country are thus as a general rule excepted from the usual application of 
state law . .. " (Cohen, 1982, p. 260). 
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
To understand how American Indians fared in the Supreme Court during the 1969- I 992 
terms, we examine two factors that could influence the Court's and the justices' decision­
making: (I) the "error correcting strategy''; and (2) the office of the Solicitor General as 
a direct and third party. 
The Error Correcting Strategy 
The U.S. Supreme Court's propensity to support the appellant, called the "error 
correcting strategy," is well chronicled (Baum, 1976, 1977, 1979; Epstein and O'Connor, 
1988; George and Epstein, 1992; Salokar, 1992; Songer, 1979; Sheehan et al., 1992; 
Wasby, 1993). Many argue that the justices take cases when they "seek to 'correct errors' 
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in the lower courts by voting to grant a hearing whenever a lower-court decision departed 
significantly from their most preferred doctrinal position" (Baum, 1977, p. 14). We expect 
that American Indian interests will also benefit from their status as appellants. More 
precisely, we expect American Indian claimants to win more often when they are the 
appellant. Conversely, their success rates should be noticeably lower when they are the 
respondent. 
The Solicitor General 
Lawyers from the office of the U.S. Solicitor General are the most frequent litigators 
before the Court and enjoy phenomenally high success rates there regardless of whether 
they represent litigants as direct or third parties (Caplan, 1987; O'Connor, 1983; Pura, 
1971; Salokar, 1992; Scigliano, 1971; Segal, 1984, 1988, 1990; Segal and Reedy, 1988 ). 
Several reasons have been offered to explain the Solicitor General's success. First, as 
Galanter ( 1974) notes, the federal government is a special kind of repeat player. The office 
has advanced intelligence, a small attrition rate, and unparalleled expertise. Second, unlike 
other parties, the Solicitor General's office is not constrained by the financial burdens of 
litigation. The office does not concern itself with start-up costs and it can continue the 
litigation process regardless of financial expenses. Third, the Solicitor General generally 
enjoys an excellent reputation with the Court, as the office is well respected for the quality 
of briefs filed and the presentation of its oral arguments (McGuire, I 993 ). 
Perhaps the most important reason for the Solicitor General's success before the Court 
results from the special relationship between the executive and judicial branches. Scigli­
ano ( 1971) argues that it was the Framer's intentions to create a harmonic relationship 
between the Court and the president to offset the most powerful branch, Congress. He 
contends that there is strong evidence for this perspective: There is a natural affinity 
between the powers of the executive and judicial branches; and, as presidential appointees, 
the justices often represent the prerogatives of the executive. 
Given these reasons, the Solicitor General's unparalleled success when representing the 
federal government before the Court is of little surprise. Scigliano' s (1971) sample of 
cases found that the Solicitor General's office won over 60% of its cases during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Additionally, Segal (1984) showed that the Supreme 
Court was more likely to uphold federal searches defended by the federal government than 
searches conducted and defended by state officials. Still, in a more recent study of the 
1959-1986 Supreme Court terms, Salokar (1992) finds that the Solicitor General's 
success rates as a direct party was approximately 70%. 
Interestingly, "the [federal] government has an even better record as amicus curiae than 
as a direct party in litigation" (Scigliano, 197 I, p. 179). Scigliano (1971) finds that the 
Solicitor General's success rates as amicus in the post 1945 era were more than 85%. Pura 
(l 971) also finds that Solicitor General was on the winning side approximately 75% of the 
time as a third party between I 920-1968. In examining sex di�crimination cases before 
the Supreme Court from 1971-1984, Segal and Reedy (1988, p. 563) conclude that "the 
position taken by the solicitor general is clearly related to the decisions of the Court." And, 
in a subsequent study, Salokar ( 1992) shows that the Solicitor General won more than 
70% of the time as an amicus between 1959-1986. 
The literature suggests that the success of American Indian claimants before the 
Supreme Court should also be influenced by the presence of the Solicitor General. When 
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the Solicitor General supports American Indian claimants as a direct or third party, their 
success rates should be higher than when there is no such support. In sharp contrast, 
American Indians' success rates should be impaired when the Solicitor General is a direct 
or third party in opposition. 
As a representative of direct and third parties, the Solicitor General should also be an 
especially active player in American Indian cases because the federal government has a 
fiduciary responsibility to American Indians. More specifically, what is called the trust 
relationship of the United States with American Indians "arises out of the constitutional 
plan to delegate plenary authority over American Indian affairs to the federal government 
and the duties of protection undertaken by treaty and federal statute" (Cohen, 1982, p. 
651).2 Thus, in many American Indian cases, the federal government acts as a trustee as
a direct or third party in protecting American Indian rights. In others, American Indians 
sue the federal government for alleged breaches in fulfilling its trust responsibility. 
METHODS 
The 82 full opinion cases regarding American Indians decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 
during its 1969-1992 terms were identified by examining the United States Reports (see 
Appendix A).3 Each case was coded as decided by the Court as for or against American
Indians or their interests. Seven cases were excluded from analysis because they were split 
decisions; that is, the Court affirmed and reversed on the central issue(s) in the case, 
leaving a population of 75 cases. To determine whether the Solicitor General participated 
and the nature of that participation, the United States Supreme Court's Records and Briefs 
on microfiche were examined for each case. 
American Indian cases are defined as those that concerned or involved American 
Indians or tribal affairs. Succes� rates were computed by dividing the number of cases in 
which the Court supported American Indian claims by the total population of cases. 
Theoretically, these scores can range from 0 to 1. The same calculations were made for 
each justice to calculate individual support rates. 
FINDINGS 
As revealed in Table l ,  American Indians collectively won 48.0% of the 75 cases decided 
by the Supreme Court during the 1969-1992 terms. The Burger Court (53%) was much 
more supportive of American Indian cases than the Rehnquist Court (31 % ). This may be 
attributed to President Reagan's and Bush's conscious efforts to appoint justices who 
echoed their conservative agendas (Schwartz, 1993, pp. 372-375; Segal and Spaeth, 1993, 
pp. 244-245). The Rehnquist Court's conservative philosophy clearly had a detrimental 
affect upon the success of American Indian claimants during the 1986-1992 terms. 
The individual support rates for American Indians evidenced by the Reagan and Bush 
appointees bolster this contention. Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist (elevated to Chief 
Justice), Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas all supported American Indians less than 
50% of the time. Justice Scalia' s voting record, for example, shows that "his initial 
ventures into the world of Indian law were extremely hostile toward Native American 
legal positions" (Wunder, 1994, p. 180). Justice Rehnquist's low support for American 
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Table 7. Courts' and Justices' Support for American Indian Case: 
1969-1992 
Support Rates Support Rates 
Support Rates as Appellant as Respondent 
justices & Court (N) (NJ (N} 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts 48.0% (75) 71 9'Yo 132)*** 30.2'Yo (43)*** 
Burger Court 52.5 (591 75.0 (28J*** 32.2 131 )*** 
Rehnqu15t Court 31.3 (16) 50.0 (4) 25.0 112) 
Douglas 93.8 (16) 100.0 (13)** 66.7 (3)** 
Marshall 75.7 170) 90.3 (31 I*** 64.1 (39)*** 
Brennan 73.5 (68) 89.7 (291*** 61.5 (39)*** 
Blackmun 62.5 (72) 68 9 1291 58.1 (43) 
Stewart 55.3 (38) 65 4 (261** 33.3 (12)** 
Burger 50.0 (58) 75.0 128)*** 26 7 (30)*** 
Harlan 50.0 (2) 100 011) 0.0 (1 I 
Powell 44.6 (56) 68.0 (25)*** 25.8 131 )*** 
White 42.7 (75) 59.4 (32)*** 30.2 143)*** 
Souter 40.0 (51 0.0 (1) 50.0141 
O'Connor 36.1 (36) 66 7 (6)** 30.0 (30)** 
Stevens 32 8 (581 33.1 (18) 32.5 (40) 
Rehnquist 29.6 (71 I 48.3 (29)*** 16.7 142)*** 
Scalia 25.0 (16) 50.0 (4J* 16.7 (12)* 
Thomas 25 0 14) 0.0 (1) 33.3 (3J 
Kennedy 10.0 (10) 0 0 (3) 14.3 (7) 
Black 0.0 (3) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 
N, Number of cases 
For the support rates of American Indian claimants as the appell<ml and respondent. a Pearson's chi-square test (one-tadedl was employed 
"'p < 001. ·•p < 0 05, **�p < () 01 
Indian claims was consistent with his generally low support rates for disadvantaged 
groups. In fact, he was more supportive of American Indian claims (30%) than for 
gender-based claims (16%) (O'Connor and Epstein, 1983, p. 328). Justice Kennedy's 
conservative jurisprudence toward civil liberties and civil rights claimants, moreover, 
carries over to American Indians (10%) (Segal and Spaeth, 1994, p. 254). And, Justice 
O'Connor's support rates for American Indian claimants are analogous with her support 
for most other minority groups (Segal and Spaeth. 1994, p. 254). 
On the other end of the ideological spectrum, Justices Douglas, Marshall, Brennan, 
Blackmun, and Stewart supported American Indian claimants in over 50% of the cases. In 
the case of Justice Douglas, his liberal tendencies have been well-documented (Rohde and 
Spaeth, 1976, p. 143; Segal and Spaeth, 1993, pp. 252-253). And, his love of the land and 
his support for American Indian interests are well-known (Johnson, 1990, pp. 191-197; 
Wilkinson, 1990, pp. 233-245). Johnson (1990, p. 206) for example, notes that Justice 
Douglas was "an ardent supporter of tribal self-determination and a firm believer that 
agreements with Indian tribes should be construed in favor of the Indians, and should be 
upheld." More interesting, is the uncharacteristic low support for American Indian 
interests by the usually more liberal Justice Stevens (33% in 58 cases). For example, 
O'Connor and Epstein (1983, p. 328) found Justice Stevens supported gender-based 
claims 57% of the time. Other studies have found him to be among the most liberal on the 
Court (Heck, 1981, p. 197: Goldman, 1982, p. 542). 
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Curiously, Justice Burger's support rates were much higher for American Indian 
claimants than for African Americans or claims involving gender. Burger supported 
American Indian claims in 58% of the 19 cases during the 1972-1976 terms, whereas he 
supported African American litigants in only 34% of the 65 cases examined by Ulmer and 
Thomson during the same period ( 1981, p. 449). Similarly, Burger· s support for American 
Indian claims were much higher (5 1 % in 39 cases) than for gender-based claims (25% in 
68 cases) for the 1969- 198 1 terms (O'Connor and Epstein, 1983, p. 328). 
Most of the other justices who served during 1969-1992 terms had similar support rates 
for American Indian claimants in relation to o ther politically disadvantaged groups (Heck, 
1981; O'Connor and Epstein, 1983; Segal and Spaeth, 1993). In sum, considerable 
variation exists among the individual justices' support rates for American Indian claims 
and the variation appears to be largely a function of the ideological predispositions of the 
justices. 
Support Scores as an Appellant 
American Indian interests clearly benefited from appellant status. As indicated in Table 
l, the Court supported American Indians as the appellant in more than 70% of the cases 
decided during the 1969- 1992 terms (and the relationship is significant at the 0.01 level). 
The Burger Court was also more supportive of American Indian� as the appellant; being 
the appellant, however, had only a moderate influence on the Rehnquist Court's decisions. 
In sharp contrast, the Court's support (1969- 1992 terms) for American Indians as the 
respondent plummets to less than a third. 
The individual justices were also more supportive of American Indians as the appel­
lant.4 With the exceptions of Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, every justice supported
American Indians as an appellant in more than 50% of the cases (and the relationship is 
significant for 9 of the 11 justices). Further, when we controlled for American Indian 
claimants as the appellant, the low support rates by Justice O'Connor possibly may be 
explained. In the 36 cases in which O'Connor participated, American Indians were the 
appellant in only 17%. O'Connor's support rates may have been higher if American 
Indians were the appellant in a greater number of cases. Conversely, with the exception 
of Justice Stevens, all of the justices support rates sharply declined when American 
Indians were the respondent. 
Issue Areas 
Table 2 reveals the kinds and distribution of issue areas in which American Indian cases 
fall. Four issues-land claims, natural resources, taxation, and what is termed here as 
procedure/jurisdiction, which are cases that involve questions peculiar to tribal claims or 
the status of reservations-make-up just under 90% of the cases decided by the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts. The types of cases decided by the Court involving American 
Indians are strikingly different than those involving African Americans and women. 
Unlike those of other politically disadvantaged groups, American Indian cases did not 
primarily involve traditional civil rights and liberties issues, at least during the 1969-1992 
terms. As a politically disadvantaged group, American Indian interests are more unique 
and diverse in relation to their counterparts. 
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Table 2. Court's Support Rates for Different American Indian Issues: 
1969-1992 
251 
Issue Area N D1str1butwn of Issues (%1 Support Rates (%1 
Procedure/] urisd1l t1on 27 29.3 50 0 
Land Claims 17 22.7 52.9 
Natural Resources 1 5 20.0 33.J 
Tax 12 16 0 75.0 
Civil R1ghts/C1vil Liberties 6 8 0 33.3 
Other 2 2 7 0.0 
Criminal 1.3 100.0 
Total 75 100.0 
Support Rates Based on Issue 
As Table 2 suggests, the success rates of American Indian claimants varied consider­
ably based on the issue area being litigated. Given that the literature does not offer many 
expectations regarding the relationship between the issue area being litigated and their 
corresponding success rates, these findings are more exploratory. 
In the procedure/jurisdiction arena, for example, American Indians won 50% of the 22 
cases. The outcome of these decisions is usually determined by whether the federal or state 
governments are trying to assume authority over American Indian affairs. American 
Indians usually win when �tates are involved and lose when the federal government is a 
party to the dispute. For example, in Cahazan Band of Mission Indians v. California 
( l  987), Justice White, writing for the majority, held that California could not regulate 
gambling on the Cabazon reservation. However, in Rhoades v. Vigil ( l  992), the Court 
held that the Indian Health Department of the United States could unilaterally abrogate a 
health program for handicapped Indian children. 
In land claim cases, American Indians enjoyed a 53% (n = 17) success rate. One of the 
most important victories for American Indians in this area was in County of Oneida v. 
Oneida Indian Nation ( 1985 ). At issue was the validity of an agreement in 1795 between 
the Oneida Indian Nation and New York regarding the transfer of land to the state 
(because the transfer did not have the required prior federal approval pursuant to the Trade 
and Intercourse Act of 1790). In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court upheld the 175-year-old 
agreement as invalid, which allowed the Oneida Indian nation a federal common law right 
to sue for breach of its possessory rights to aboriginal lands. 
In the area of natural resources, American Indians were not as successful as in land 
claims or procedure/jurisdiction issues. They won only a third of these cases. The low 
success rates in the natural resource cases may be attributed to the Court's tendency to 
defer to the state's and Congress's police powers to preserve scarce resources in spite of 
the fact that re�ources are also critical to the survival of tribes, as tribes. In United States 
v. Dion ( l  986), for example, the Court held that, pursuant to the Eagle Protection Act,
American Indians were prohibited from hunting eagles. 
By contrast. American Indians enjoyed a very high success rate in taxation cases, 75% 
(n = 12). Most of these cases involved attempts by states to tax individuals who resided 
in Indian country. This high success rate may be due to a long line of precedent established 
by the Court as well as by the codification of these principles in the Indian Civil Rights 
Act of 1968. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 prohibits state jurisdiction on tribal 
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lands, unless consent is attained by Congress or the affected tribe. Further, since Worces­
ter v. Georgia (1832), the Court has consistently held that states are, as a general rule, 
excluded from regulating tribal affairs. As the Court held in McClanahan v. Arizana State 
Tax Commission (1973), this principle also applies to state taxation. The Rehnquist Court, 
however, has started to chip away at this standard in Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. 
New Mexico (1989). In this case, the Court held that New Mexico could tax non- Indian 
oil producers on the reservation because the company's business involved non- Indian 
commerce. 
The Role of the Solicitor General 
One of the central expectations of this study was that the Solicitor General's office 
would be a particularly active participant in American Indian cases. This was the case. The 
Solicitor General's office either represented or filed an amici brief in 89% of the 75 cases 
decided by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts: The office supported American Indian 
interests in 41 of the 75 cases (54%) and was the opponent in some form in 26 of the 75 
cases (35%). In contrast, Salokar (1992. p. 21), for example, finds that the Solicitor 
General participated in only "48.5% of all cases decided on the merits by the Court from 
1959-1989. " 
Solicitor General in Support of American Indians 
Table 3 reveals the impact of the Solicitor General when representing and/or filing an 
amicus on behalf of American Indian interests. The Burger and Rehnquist Court's support 
rates are only moderately higher when the Solicitor General participates in any form. 
Although the Solicitor General as an amicus positively affected the overall success of 
American Indian claimants, the office's success as an amicus in American Indian cases is 
much lower than those found in other studies (Pura, 1971; Salokar, 1992; Segal, 1984, 
1988, 1990). More interesting, however, is that the Solicitor General did not appear to 
have any influence on American Indian claimant's success as a direct party. 
Although Segal (1988, pp. 138-139) concludes that the "solicitor general's ability to 
win . . .  is not dependent upon the type of issue being decided," Ivers and Parker (1993, 
p. 10) find that in religion cases prior to 1980 the Solicitor General "lost more cases than 
it won as an amicus litigant. " Thus, the office's success may not only be dependent upon 
the issue being litigated, but the party it chooses to support. This is the central finding for 
the American Indian case. 
The Solicitor General's influence (as a direct or third party on behalf of American 
Indian interests) on the individual justices' support rates varied. Justices Marshall, 
Brennan, Blackmun, Stewart, Souter, O'Connor, Stevens, Rehnquist, and Kennedy all 
were influenced by the Solicitor General's presence on behalf of American Indian 
interests, whereas Justices Douglas, Burger, Powell, White, Scalia, and Thomas were not. 
The Solicitor General's influence on the justices' voting behavior does not seem to be 
based on their ideological preferences. Both conservative and liberal justices alike were 
affected by the office's presence. This may indicate that the affect of the Solicitor General 
is justice specific. Thus, while the Solicitor General played an instrumental role in the 
decision-making calculus for some justices, different factors were more compelling for 
others. 
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Table 3. Impact of the Solicitor General in Support of American Indian 
Cases: 1 969-1992 
Support Rates when the· 
Solicitor General 
as a Party! Solicitor General Sol1c1tor General 
Am1cus on as a Party on as an Amicus 
behalf of behalf of on behalf o( 
Overall American Indian American Indian American Indian 
Courts and Justices Support Rates Claimants (NJ Claimants (N! Claimants (N) 
Burger and Rehnquist 48 0 (75'Yo) 5G. 1 (4 1 )* 4() 7 ( 151 h 1.5 (26)** 
Courts 
Burger Court 52.5 (591 57.9 (38) 50.0 1 4) 62.5 (24)* 
Rehnquist Court 31.J ( 1  GI 33 3 rn 0.0 1 ) 50.0 (2) 
Douglas 93.8 116) 87.5 (8) 75.0 14) 100.0 (4) 
Marshall 75.7 170) 84.2 (38)** 7 1.4 (14) 91 .7 (24)*** 
Brennan 73 5 (68) 81 1 (37)* G4.3 \14) 9 1.3 (231*** 
Blackmun 62.5 175) 70.0 (40)* 66.7 (151 72.0 (251 
Stewart 55.3 1381 60.0 (25) 72.7 (111* 50.0 (141 
Burger 50.0 (58) SS 3 (381 50.0 (141 58.3 124) 
Powell 44.G (56) 47.2 (361 4h 2 1 31 47.8 (23) 
White 42.7 (751 43 9 (41) 40 0 (151 46.2 126) 
Souter 40.0 (5) 100.0 (2)** NA. 100.0 (2)** 
O'Connor 3G.1 (361 Sn . . > 1 61*** 0 0 14) 75.0I12)*** 
Stevens 32.8 (58) 42.4 (33)** 63.7I11 )*** 31.8 (22) 
Rehnquist 29 6 (71) 36.6(41)* 4h 7 (15J'* 30.8 (26) 
Scalia 25.0 (16) 33.1 1 ) 0.0 (11 50 0 (2) 
Thomas 25 0 (4) )() 0 121 NA 50.0 (2) 
Kennedy 10.0 (10) 33.3 (3)* 0.0 ( 1  I 50.0 (2)** 
N, "umber ot L.1<,PS 
A Pt'dr':ion'-, Ch1-squ<HP test 1um'-t,1iled) vv,1s pmployed *p < 0 10, **p < (L0'1, ***p < 0 01 
The Solicitor General as an Opponent 
As Table 4 shows, the Solicitor General had a more profound affect when representing 
a direct party against American Indian interests than when representing a party on behalf 
of their claims. American Indians lost 68% (or won 32%) of the 22 cases when the 
Solicitor General opposed them as a direct party during the 1969-1992 terms. For the 
Burger Court. American Indians lost 62% (or won 38%) of their cases; and, during the 
more conservative Rehnquist Court, American Indians lost 83% (or won only 17%). This 
finding garners more support for the contention that the Solicitor General's success may 
be constrained by the position the office takes. Given that the Solicitor General filed an 
amici brief against American Indians in only 4 of the 75 cases (5% ), it is difficult to reach 
any strong conclusions regarding the office's atypical affect on American Indian claim­
ant's success before the Court. 
Once again, the Solicitor General's impact as a direct party against American Indian 
interests on the individual justices' decisions varied. The Solicitor General's presence as 
a direct party was significant on the decision� of Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, 
Stewart, Powell, Souter, O'Connor, and Rehnquist. The central finding, once again, is that 
the office's affect on the justices· support rates crossed ideological camps, indicating that 
other forces in addition to the justices' attitudes were at work. 
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Table 4. Impact of the Solicitor General as an Opponent in American 
Indian Cases : 1969-1992 
Support Rates when the. 
Soliutor General as a Sol1cttor General Solicitor General as 
Party!Amicus Aga1nst as a Party Against an Amicus Aga1nst 
Overall American Indian American Indian American Indian 
justices & Court Support Rates Claimants (NJ Claimants (NJ Clamants (NJ 
Burger and Rehnquist 48.0 (75) 34.6'\lo (26)** 31.8%(22)** 50.0% (4) 
Courts 
Burger Court 52.5 (59) .rn.8 ( 18)** 37.5 (16)* 50.0 (2) 
Rehnquist Court 31.3(16) 25.0 (8) 16 7 (6) 50 0 (2) 
Douglas 93.8 (16) 100 0 171 100.0 16) 100.0 (1) 
Marshall 75.7 (70) 54.2 (241*** 47.6 121)*** 100.0 (3) 
Brennan 73.5 (68) 56.5 (23 )*** 50.0 (20)*** 100.0 (3) 
Blackmun 62.5 (72) 41.7 (24)*** 38.1 121 )*** 66.7 (3) 
Stewart 55.3 (2) 41.7 (12) 36.4 (11 )* 100.0 (1) 
Burger 50.0 (58) 35 3 (17)* 40.0 (15) 0.0 (2)* 
Harlan 50.0 (2) 50 0 (2) 50.0 (2) NA. 
Powell 44.6 (56) 29.4117)* 25.0 ( 16)** 100.0 (1) 
White 42.7 (75) 38.5 (26) 40.9 (22) 25.0 (4) 
Souter 40.0 (SJ 0 0 (3)** 0 0 (2)* 0.0 (1) 
O'Connor 36.1 (36) 14.3 (14)** 09.1 (11)*** 33.3 \3) 
Stevens 32.8 \58) 27.8 (18) 33.3 (15) 0.0 (3) 
Rehnquist 29.6171) 18.8 (22)* 15.8 (19)* 33.3 (3) 
Scalia 25.0 (16) 25.0 (81 16.7 (6) 50.0 (2) 
Thomas 25.0 (16) 0 0 (2) 0 0 (1) 0.0 (1) 
Kennedy 10.0 (10) 0.0 (3) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 
Black 0 0 (3) 0.0 (3) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 
N, Number of c.Jse., 
A Pearson's chi-square test (one-tailerl) wris employed *p < 0 10, **p < 0 05, **"p < O 01 
CONCLUSION 
Oppressed by majoritarian institutions, American Indians turned to the courts to lobby for 
their interests. Although the Burger Court's support for American Indian claims was 
slightly more than 50%, Indians confronted a more antagonistic political environment 
during the Rehnquist Court. The conservative judicial appointees made by Presidents 
Reagan and Bush had a damaging affect on American Indian interests. Individual justices' 
support rates for American Indian claimants varied, however, ranging from 0 to 94%. This 
variation appeared to be largely based on the ideological preferences of the justices. 
In addition to the political preferences of the justices, the success of American Indians 
before Burger and Rehnquist Courts can be attributed to other factors. American Indian 
claimants clearly benefited from being the appellant. The justices and the Court employed 
the "error correcting" strategy, taking cases to correct "mistakes'' below. 
Additionally, the Court's support for American Indian claims depended upon the issue 
area litigated, with the Court being more supportive of tax cases and less supportive of 
natural resource claims. American Indian claimant's success in tax cases may be due to 
Congress producing clear guidelines in this area for the courts. It may be that in order for 
American Indians to fare better in other areas, Congress will need to give direction to the 
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Court-especially in eras when conservatives dominate the Court and its decision­
making. 
The Solicitor General's influence as a direct or third party in American Indian cases 
depended upon the position it took in the case. Interestingly, the office's success was 
thwarted when it advanced American Indian interests, and the Solicitor General was more 
likely to win when Indian interests were opposed. Additionally, the Solicitor General's 
impact on the individual justices' behavior also varied and it was not a function of the 
justices' ideological preferences. Both conservative and liberal justices alike were affected 
by the Solicitor General's presence. 
APPENDIX A 
TABLE OF CASES 
Cabawn Band of Mission Indians v. California, 480 U.S. 202 ( 1987) 
Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 ( 1831) 
Cotton Petroleum Company v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 ( 1989) 
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) 
Elk v. Wilkins, I 12 U.S. 94 (1884) 
Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 3 17 (1892) 
McClanahan v. Ariwna State Tax Commission, 41 I U.S. 164 (1973) 
Rhoades v. Vigil. 113 S.Ct. 2025 (1992) 
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) 
United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 ( 1903) 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (I 959) 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 5 15 (1832) 
American Indian Cases: 1969-1992 October Terms* 
Tonnipah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 ( 1970). 
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970). 
Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 ( 1971 ). 
United States v. Southern Ute Tribe, 402 U.S. I 59 (1972). 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 ( 1972). 
United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80 (1972). 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 41 1 U.S. 145 (I 973). 
McClanahan v. Ariwna State Tax Commission, 4 1  I U.S. 164 (1973). 
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973). 
United States v. Mason, 4 I 2 U.S. 391 ( 1973 ). 
Martz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973). 
Department of Game, Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, 4 14 U.S. 44 (1973). 
Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974). 
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 ( 1975). 
Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 ( 1975). 
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Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power Commission, 420 U.S. 395 (1975). 
DeCouteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). 
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (l 976). 
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976). 
Bryan v. ltsaca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976). 
Delaware Tribal Business v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). 
United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 ( 1977). 
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977). 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978). 
Washington v. Confederated Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). 
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979). 
Washington et al. v. Washington State Commercial Passenger, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). 
United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980). 
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980). 
Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980). 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980). 
White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 448 U.S. 160 (1980). 
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 448 U.S. 608 (1980). 
Montana v. United States and Crow Tribe et al., 450 U.S. 544 (1981 ). 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982). 
Arizana v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983). 
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). 
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983). 
United States v. Mitchell//, 463 U.S. 207 (1983). 
Arizana v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983). 
Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983). 
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 ( 1984). 
Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984). 
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 
138 (1984). 
United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985). 
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 661 (1985). 
Kerr-McGee Corporation v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985). 
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 749 (1985). 
National Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (1985). 
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Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe. 473 U.S. 753 (1985). 
California State Board of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, ( 1985). 
United States v. Dion, 474 U.S. 734 (1986). 
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 130 ( 1986). 
South Carolina v. Catawba Tribe, 476 U.S. 498 (1986). 
United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834 (1986). 
Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 ( 1986). 
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
California v. Cabazon Mission of Indians, 480 U.S. 202 ( 1987) 
Amoco Production v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 ( 1987). 
United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700 ( 1987). 
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 
(1988). 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 874 (1990). 
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 ( 1990). 
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505 (1991 ). 
Blatchford v. Native Village r�f Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991). 
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 ( 1993). 
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993). 
Rhoades v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993). 
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993). 
*Cases listed include those decided in favor or against American Indian interests as well
as split decisions. Per curiam decisions are also provided. 
Acknowledgment: This is a revised version of a paper prepared for delivery at the 1994 annual 
meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois. The author would like to 
thank .\1ing H. Lee, Karen O'Connor, and Thomas G. Walker for their invaluable comments. Special 
gratitude must also be extended to David A. Freeman and the three anonymous reviewers for thelf 
constructive criticism. 
NOTES 
1. Although American Indians are truly a disadvantaged minority in terms of a sense of power­
lessness, numbers, racial or cultural characteristics, and a sense of group solidarity, their 'itatus 
as citizens in separate tribal nations gives them an umque political status that is different from 
that of other disadvantaged groups. Thus, the relationship between the Umted States and 
American Indians 1s also a political one. 
2. See, generally Cherokee Nation v. State of Georf!.ra ( 1831 ), United States v. Rickert (1903), 
Felix v. Patnck (1892), Elk v. Wilkins (1884), and Williams v. Lee (1959).
3. Per curiam decisions dunng this period were excluded. The author specifically chose not to use 
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the Spaeth data base because the Spaeth data base operationalizes American Indian cases as 
those in which American Inclians are a party. This study, m contrast, examine all cases that had 
an influence on issues critical to American Indian interests, including those cases where the 
federal government is a party in aN case on behalf of American Indian interests. 
4. Justices who served in less than five cases where American Indians were the appellant are 
excluded from this analysis, as it i5 difficult to reach meaningful conclu5ions regarding their 
behavior. 
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